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Abstract

Information and Communications Technology (ICT) infrastructures and systems are
being widely deployed to support a broad range of users and application scenarios. A key
trend here is the emergence of many different “smart” technology paradigms along with an
increasingly diverse array of networked sensors, e.g., for smart homes and buildings, intelligent transportation and autonomous systems, emergency response, remote health monitoring
and telehealth, etc. As billions of these devices come online, ICT networks are being tasked
with transferring increasing volumes of data to support intelligent real-time decision making
and management. Indeed, many applications and services will have very stringent Quality
of Service (QoS) and security requirements.
In light of the above, effective and secure end-to-end delivery of user data flows is a
major focus for network operators. Now in recent years, Software-Defined Networking (SDN)
has emerged as a leading communication technology for supporting the evolving service needs
of ICT infrastructures. However, even though various efforts have conducted research work,
prototype development, and deployment of SDN-based solutions in smaller ICT scenarios,
future contributions are still needed. Most notably, there is a lack of cohesive mechanisms
for enhancing end-to-end QoS and security for real-time services in SDN systems.

vii

Foremost, stringent delay-sensitive data services, such as emergency response, require
effective QoS mechanisms to reduce end-to-end path latency and minimize SDN controller
response times. Here, a key concern is how to handle short-term network state fluctuations
due to congestion while ensuring latency performance. In addition, security issues, such as
large scale Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, also pose serious threats to SDN
environments. Although various Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS) have
been proposed to detect and mitigate such attacks, they often entail significant performance
overheads and excessive inspection and/or mitigation times, rendering them impractical.
In light of the above, this dissertation study presents some novel solutions and mechanisms for improving QoS support and security (related to data-control saturation) in SDNenabled ICT infrastructures. Specifically, an adaptive solution is presented to achieve rapid
path computation by leveraging active link latency measurements to generate efficient statistical estimates. Furthermore, a novel priority queueing mechanism is also proposed to
improve support for higher-grade services traffic. This solution also integrates and prioritizes
control plane traffic to improve overall response and delivery times. Finally, a lightweight
kernel-based IDPS scheme is also developed to thwart data-control saturation attacks by
leveraging modular string search and filtering techniques. In particular, this solution uses
dynamic/self-adjusted detection thresholds to improve attack detection. The proposed methods are all prototyped and tested in the National Science Foundation (NSF) Global Environment for Network Innovations (GENI), a live real-world distributed network testbed facility.

viii

Overall, detailed performance evaluations show that the proposed solutions properly address
and resolve many of the research problems outlined in this dissertation study.
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Chapter 1 : Introduction

This dissertation studies the performance and security of Software-Defined Networking (SDN) setups in emerging Information and Communications Technology (ICT) infrastructures. Namely, a key focus is on end-to-end delay management for Quality of Service
(QoS) support, which is directly affected by SDN controller response time, switching latency,
and path computation and selection overheads. In addition, another key focus is the security
of such SDN infrastructures against large scale flooding attacks. Hence this initial chapter
provides an introduction to some of the main developments in these domains and then introduces the key motivations for this work. The core contributions of this research are then
presented in a high-level modality, along with an overview of the rest of this thesis.
1.1

Background Overview
Modern ICT networking systems already form an indispensable part of modern life.

Moreover, these infrastructures are constantly being evolved to take on more expansive roles
and support an increasingly broad range of emerging “smart” paradigms. Some notable examples here include smart homes and buildings, intelligent transportation and autonomous
vehicles, emergency response services, work from home, remote health monitoring and telehealth, etc. Furthermore, a key supporting component here is the emergence and widespread
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adoption of smaller, lower cost networked sensor devices for information/data gathering,
widely termed as the Internet of Things (IoT). As billions of these devices come online to
support many “smart” technology paradigms, traffic volumes are continuing to grow.
Overall, end-to-end QoS support and network security are key requirements for ICT
infrastructures carrying an increasingly diverse range of client traffic. Some of the main
concerns for networking-enabled services typically include, but are not limited to, routing
path computation and selection, QoS support and congestion management, traffic prioritization, disaster response, effective security policies, and targeted attack mitigation. Indeed,
modern cloud computing services, IoT paradigms, and other emerging communication technologies open up many new challenges here. These concerns are further compounded by
the exponentially increasing heterogeneity and scalability of data services and last mile access technologies. However current enterprise and legacy IP routing technologies (along
with their decentralized networking and computing infrastructures) are not well-suited for
emerging ICT-based services with stringent real-time data transfers needs. As a result, the
technical community is starting to deploy SDN technologies in modern ICT infrastructures
in order to improve application-level QoS performance and dynamic service provisioning [1].
1.2

Motivations
ICT networks must provide services support for a broad range of intelligent devices,

applications, and systems that are embedded into an ambient environments. Namely, some
examples here include sensors integrated in wearable equipment (e.g., such as smart watches),
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actuation and automation-enabled devices in smart homes and buildings, vehicular sensors
and on-board units for car maintenance and accident avoidance, and so on. These smart
devices (along with their associated control systems, automation technologies, and network
elements) are all merged together into a networked ecosystem to enable efficient and reliable
“smart” application support [2].

Figure 1.1: A high-level overview of SDN architecture layers.

Now increasingly, many ICT networks are starting to leverage SDN-based technology.
This approach uses a centralized controller to separate and consolidate the control plane of
a network, allowing streamlined automation of administration, service provisioning, and
security policies. In particular, SDN controllers can be programmed to support a wide range
of customized applications and make use of the standardized Representational State Transfer
(REST) Application Programming Interface (API). The overall SDN architecture is depicted
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in Figure 1.1, including the main planes/layers and their functionalities. In particular, the
three planes are defined here:

• Control Plane: Centralized control structure that embodies a controller and a Network Operating System (NOS). This layer provides hardware-based abstractions for
SDN applications as well as a holistic view of the entire network [3], [4].
• Data Plane: Termed as the infrastructure or forwarding layer and consists of integrated forwarding elements/components, i.e., switches. Each component maintains a
set of rules for directing networking traffic according to the instructions received from
the control plane [3], [4].
• Application Plane: Set of SDN-based applications that support different customized
operations and functionalities, including, but not limited to, QoS support, network
security and policy services, as well as implementations [3], [4].

Now unlike legacy routing networks, SDN uses software modules (running at the
controller) to generate and place rules for handling data at the switching devices, i.e., instead of using distributed routing protocols. This capability can provide more streamlined
and rapid run-time distribution of traffic forwarding rules and security policies. Specifically,
SDN controllers operate with a logically centralized global view of network resources. This
information can be leveraged to implement customized provisioning strategies and further
coupled with programmable interfaces to insert and push forwarding rules to switches via
southbound protocols, e.g., such as OpenFlow [5], [6], OpenContrail [7], and Extensible Mes-
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saging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) [8]. As such, the “programmability” of the network
infrastructure layer in SDN provides a dynamic and cost-effective configuration management
solution for ICT services. For instance, SDN can be used to control and regulate IoT systems
by expanding connectivity to smart homes using capacity sharing [9]. Alternatively, SDN
can be used to assure security for routing devices [2] or improve mobility support in clouds
[10], [11].
To date, many studies have looked at the application of SDN in various ICT applications. For example, some efforts have focused on QoS latency and response time management,
e.g., [12], [13], [14], [15], [16]. Other studies have also tried to improve the performance of
switching devices using various optimization and TE approaches, such as [17], [18], [19].
Nevertheless, despite these contributions, various open challenges still remain here. For example, there is a further need to leverage the real-time data collection/processing capabilities
at SDN controllers to achieve more effective, dynamic path computation. This is of particular importance to real-time traffic flows with tight delay QoS bounds (which can easily be
impacted by time-varying bursty traffic). Furthermore, there is also a need to support priority queueing for multiple traffic levels in SDN networks. These data plane traffic priorities
also need to be properly integrated with SDN control plane traffic.
However, the use of SDN-based technologies also introduces many new attack vectors
for malicious actors [20]. Some key examples here include DDoS attacks [21], Link Discovery
Service (LDS) exploitation [20], [22], and Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks [20]. Indeed
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many of these exploits have already been demonstrated in real SDN settings. Accordingly,
various efforts have also looked at improving the security of SDN operation. Of particular
concern are large scale DoS flooding attacks, which can be used to overwhelm both the
data and control planes in SDN. For example, the SLICOTS [23] and OPERETTA [24] solutions try to thwart Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) SYN flooding attacks by surveiling
failed SYN requests. However, there is a further need to develop more effective DoS security
solutions here. In particular, these methods should leverage the real-time traffic monitoring capabilities of SDN controllers to implement more dynamic schemes for DoS/flooding
detection and mitigation.
1.3

Problem Statement
This dissertation addresses the above challenges and presents a set of novel solutions

for improving QoS and security support for SDN-based user services. Specifically, these
methods include intelligent Traffic Engineering (TE) path selection as well as priority-based
queueing schemes to improve end-to-end service latency. In addition, dynamic IDPS security mechanisms are also proposed to mitigate flooding saturation threats in SDN-based
infrastructures.
1.4

Proposed Work and Contributions
The key contributions of this dissertation effort include the following:

1)

End-to-end latency management: A novel framework is proposed to manage endto-end latency by leveraging globalized control and topological views at the SDN con-
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troller. Specifically, these include latencies associated with path search and selection
and controller-switch communication.
2)

Priority-queueing support: A novel priority queueing mechanism is introduced to
improve service support for higher-grade traffic flows. In particular, this solution also
integrates control plane traffic to improve overall response and delivery times.

3)

Saturation and flooding attack mitigation: A novel kernel-based IDPS scheme
is proposed using a dynamic threshold-based strategy for detecting TCP SYN flood
attacks on SDN infrastructures. This solution improves controller response times and
reduces traffic processing overheads.
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. First, Chapter 2 presents a sur-

vey of the latest research work on QoS and security support in SDN infrastructures. Next,
Chapter 3 presents a novel scheme for end-to-end latency reduction in SDN environments.
Building upon this, Chapter 4 details a priority-based solution for SDN traffic management. Finally, Chapter 5 addresses the critical issue of SDN security and details a dynamic
threshold-based countermeasures solution for detecting and mitigating TCP SYN flooding
attacks. Finally, conclusions and future research directions are presented in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 2 : Survey of Related Work

The overall topic of QoS support in SDN-enabled communication systems has received
a significant amount of attention in the last decade, specifically due to the contemporary
nature of this technology and its potential challenges. Along these lines, this chapter presents
an overview of some of the latest developments and state-of-art efforts in this particular
domain, i.e., including work on latency management, controller overhead reduction, priorityaware flow forwarding, and flooding and data-control plane saturation issues. A broad range
of associated mechanisms and provisioning schemes are also surveyed. Lastly, some key open
research challenges are summarized to motivate this dissertation study.
2.1

QoS Guarantees in SDN Communication Systems
By one definition, QoS is the qualitative measurement of the overall performance

of networking-enabled services, e.g., based upon metrics such as bandwidth throughput,
end-to-end communication delays, loss, etc. [12]. Now as noted in Chapter 1, delivering
QoS support in SDN-based environments is of a key importance for many users in emerging
“smart” technology paradigms [25]. Here SDN provides an effective framework for expediting
traffic management and control in emerging data networking environments. Furthermore,
SDN also presents a global view of network resources and implements centralized control
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provisioning by decoupling network control from the data plane [12]. Hence SDN controllers
can simply “program” forwarding rules by pushing them over their southbound interfaces
to SDN-enabled switches, e.g., such as Open vSwitch [6]. These capabilities allow network
operators to achieve a holistic view of user data flows and build tailored management applications for their clients, e.g., such as TE routing [12], QoS-aware flow routing [26] [27], flow
inspection [28], Science De-Militarized Zone (DMZ), and even full in-line Intrusion Detection
and Prevention System (IDPS). Namely, the abstraction of the network infrastructure allows
networking administrators to program new features and policies through a standard open
API without having to adjust their physical infrastructure plane.
Now many high-end users have stringent QoS delays bound requirements, mandating
effective management of associated control and switching plane latencies (in SDN settings).
Hence various research studies have been carried out to explore and enhance QoS support in
SDN networks. Furthermore, the majority of these earlier studies have focused on addressing
data plane and packet sojourn times [12], [29]. Carefully note that the data-control communication delay in SDN networks (e.g., time between OpenFlow P acket In and P acket Out
messages) has a significant impact on traffic delivery performance. Indeed, this delay is inevitable between the data and control planes given the inherently centralized nature of SDN
operations (and this represents an additional factor in latency increase).
Furthermore, SDN-based switching devices, e.g., such as Open vSwitch platforms,
process packets/flows according to the rules injected by the SDN controller through its
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southbound interface. Namely, these flow rules are inserted by the SDN controller into data
plane nodes in either a proactive or reactive manner. Specifically, in the former approach, the
controller populates the traffic rules prior the arrival of traffic to the forwarding switch device.
Meanwhile in the latter approach, the controller injects and adjusts flow rules dynamically
and in real-time. Expectedly, flooding attacks causing data-control saturation (e.g., TCP
SYN floods) can complicate reactive flow rule insertion (discussed in Section 2.4).
2.2

Latency and Response Time Management
In the past, various efforts have also looked at the performance of SDN OpenFlow

devices. However, most of these studies have not presented efficient mechanisms to manage
controller response delays at the control plane. For example, Curtis et al. [13] demonstrated
that the collection rate of SDN topology statistics is strictly limited by dimensionality of
flow tables. This study also confirmed that collecting such measurements can significantly
impact the update rate of flow rules. Accordingly, the authors tabled a solution to reduce
the impact the of overheads associated with flow rule matching and processing. Meanwhile,
other studies such as Huang et al. [30] and Rotsos et al. [31] also presented an in-depth look
at the performance of OpenFlow switches across a broad range of vendor devices.
Other researchers have also focused on efficient resource allocation in SDN setups.
For example, Egilmez et al. [14] presented a solution to improve QoS support in OpenFlowbased networks by guaranteeing end-to-end bandwidth allocation for multimedia streaming.
Additionally, Sharma et al. [15] also introduced an SDN-based QoS framework leveraging
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the capabilities of the Floodlight SDN controller [32]. Namely, this scheme assigns one
SDN controller per Autonomous System (AS) routing domain and uses it to communicate
through a northbound interface to handle OpenFlow policies (while guaranteeing efficient
bandwidth allocation between end-user hosts). Also, Celenlioglu and Mantar [33] presented
a framework for routing and resource allocation/management while considering initial routes
in SDN-enabled intra-domain settings. This solution was shown to enhance overall routing
scalability and improve QoS support.
Furthermore, Jinyao et al. [34] also presented HiQoS, a multi-path mechanism to
ensure QoS guarantees in SDN environments. Namely, OpenFlow-based queuing mechanisms
were applied to implement bandwidth management and allocation for different types of
networking traffic. Multi-path selection was also done here based upon a modified version of
the Dijkstra algorithm with QoS constraints. Similarly, Tariq and Bassiouni [35] proposed
QAMO-SDN, a QoS-aware solution that implemented multi-path routing in smaller SDNenabled data center environments. Namely, the proposed solution pre-computed multiple
paths between two end-user hosts using the Dijkstra algorithm, and the authors tested their
solution in a simulated networking environment.
Similarly, Huang et al. [36] presented another SDN-based multi-path framework for
GridFTP (big data transfer protocol). Again, this solution leveraged the Dijkstra algorithm
for path selection. Meanwhile, Hussain et al. [37] also assessed a hash-based mechanism
for multi-path selection in SDN networks using the Floodlight controller. Specifically, this
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solution was designed to schedule different flows by using a hash function to forward them
in a balanced manner over pre-computed routes. Finally, Basit et al. [16] detailed a crosslayer coordination scheme between different Internet Service Providers (ISPs) running SDN
setups, i.e., peering across multiple Internet Exchange Points (IXPs). This solution focused
on improving network throughput and resource efficiency by computing all available endto-end paths between any pair of nodes. Note that this work assumed the availability of
OpenFlow switches with multi-queueing support.
However, despite these many contributions, none of the above studies have tried to
leverage real-world time series (TS) data to further improve path selection. Although some
TS-based estimation approaches have been proposed [38], they have not been implemented
for a per-link latency calculation and QoS-aware path selection in SDN environments.
2.3

SDN-Based Priority Queueing
Rapid response time is a critical requirement for many high-grade user services. In

particular, timely communications play a vital role in emergency response services, i.e.,
since it can directly impact human life and property [39], [40]. However, network resource
coordination and decision making can be very challenging under such circumstances [41].
Namely, fast response times can be difficult to achieve and hence associated information
infrastructures (providing decision support) must be tailored for highly-responsive operation
[42]. At the same time, network operators must maintain existing Service Level Agreements
(SLAs) in order to prevent sizable revenue losses [43], [44]. As a result, customers are
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usually assigned different traffic priority levels [41] during emergency situations, and traffic
processing decisions are made accordingly [45]. However, most existing emergency response
communication setups are ill-equipped to handle such requirements, i.e., since they are largely
built using older distributed routing protocol technologies. It is here that SDN-based systems
offer much potential.
Now many research studies in the past have proposed TE-based solutions, e.g., to
improve QoS (for data traffic flows with different priority levels), improve capacity utilization, and minimize flow processing delays and controller response times [46]. For example,
Google [47] has applied SDN capabilities to improve capacity utilization between its data
centers by using application-specific priority levels. Egilmez, et al. [14] also proposed a
SDN-based scheme that used dynamic routing to prioritize multimedia traffic over normal
flows, whereas Rahouti, et al. [26] presented a SDN framework for emergency response traffic. Nevertheless, even though SDN offers a broad range of services via its control plane,
many of these solutions do not support multi-priority data plane flows or prioritize control
plane traffic (by default) [48].
Furthermore, priority queueing and load balancing mechanisms for OpenFlow devices
have also been studied, i.e., to support a broad range of QoS-based services and deliver
preferential management for certain types of data plane flows [49]. Specifically, several
studies have looked at reinforcing switching devices by using optimization techniques [15],
[19], [50]. However, these efforts do not handle flows with differing priority levels, which
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require efficient management at both the data and control plane levels [48]. Hence, improved
control mechanisms are still needed to manage overheads in SDN settings, e.g., controller
response times and flow rule processing delays. Specifically, these solutions must take into
account the queueing mechanisms in both control and data planes.
Meanwhile, other studies have also looked at modeling the behaviors of forwarding
devices with SDN controllers using analytical models, e.g., such as Miao et al. [50] and
Azodolmolky et al. [51]. However, in order to simplify analytical tractability, these methods
have assumed basic first come first serve (FCFS) queueing and processing of all data plane
flows. As a result, these solutions impose key limitations on both data and control plane
packet flows, i.e., since all data flow packets are treated with the same priority level, and
control plane traffic is also intermixed. As a result, this simplification can result in QoS
degradation for stringent emergency response services.
Overall, the above studies assume that network control logic/intelligence is only deployed at the centralized control plane level, i.e., relegating little/no intelligence at the
switching devices. As a result, the data plane handles all incoming packets in a FCFS manner regardless of their priority level. Hence these forwarding methods do not leverage any
available SDN control feedback features to manage data plane queues. Now other studies
have also tried to characterize incoming flows by port numbers, albeit with lower accuracy
[18]. However, none of these studies have presented a practical SDN prototype that leverages
intelligent control capabilities along with priority-based queueing methods (at both the data
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and control planes) to minimize control response times.
2.4

Saturation and Flooding Threats in SDN
As noted earlier, SDN is being widely deployed to enhance network QoS support [28].

However recent studies have also revealed some critical, inherent security vulnerabilities
in existing SDN setups [52]. As a result, researchers have also looked at improving the
security of the SDN control plane. In particular, Mahout [53] proposed a mechanism to
prevent flooding threats in SDN setups. However this solution was premised upon statistic
aggregation techniques, which renders it impractical against data-to-control layer saturation
attacks (that may exploit micro-flows). Meanwhile KernelDetect [28] presented a lightweight
kernel space IDPS approach using modular string search and filtering schemes to detect and
mitigate DoS threats. Also, the Avant-Guard scheme [54] detailed a solution to alleviate
saturation attacks by using flow alteration techniques in OpenFlow switching devices.
Recently, Tian et al. [55] also presented FlowSec and Blackbox, two strategies to
counter DoS threats by limiting the number of packets sent to the controller in a given time
interval. These methods also keep track of attack levels while trying to mitigate floods.
Meanwhile PrioGuard [56] detailed a DoS mitigation scheme using a non-cooperative repeated game, whereas FloodDefender [57] introduced a protocol-independent solution for
DoS mitigation. Namely, FloodDefender tries to secure both the control and data layers by
leveraging table-miss engineering and packet filter approaches. Meanwhile, [58] presented
another solution that tries to prevent reforwarded requests-based flooding attacks in multi-
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domain SDN environments. Specifically, this approach uses an adaptive rate adjustment
method to change the re-forwarding rate. Additionally, MinDoS [59] used a priority manager to prevent DoS attacks. Namely, flows are forwarded to multiple buffer queues with
varying priority levels to enhance controller security. Bharathi et al. in [60] also proposed a
path randomization and flow aggregation-based solution to resolve the impact of DoS attacks
on switch flow tables. Furthermore, SDNManager tabled a lightweight framework for DoS
prevention in SDN infrastructures using flow bandwidth change forecasts [61]. Finally, [62]
and [63] presented secure controller mechanisms to prevent DoS attacks against both the control and date planes. Specifically, [63] is an improved prototype version of [62] which deploys
new triggers to detect and prevent DoS attacks. The proposed solution was implemented
and evaluated over a hardware SDN testbed using the RYU controller software.
Some studies have also focused on SYN flooding attacks. For example, SYN flooding
traffic was identified in [64] by assessing the ratio of TCP SYN packets to TCP ACK flows
produced by the same entities. However, it is impractical to leverage this strategy since
identifying malicious packets in large traffic pools and then accurately marking threatening
flows in real-time is very challenging. Meanwhile, Deng, et al. [65] also studied SYN flooding
threats in order to improve SDN resiliency. Other notable studies on SYN flooding attacks
also include SLICOTS [23] and OPERETTA [24], as presented by R. Mohammadi et al. and
S. Fichera et al, respectively. These IDPS schemes thwart such attacks by surveiling failed
TCP SYN requests and blocking malicious adversarial hosts.
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Overall, the majority of the above schemes have focused on improving the internal
interactions between modules in the application-controller-switch infrastructure, i.e., to address external DoS saturation threats in SDN environments. Nevertheless, few efforts have
considered the use of dynamic/self-adapting detection threshold mechanisms to handle realistic scenarios where flooding traffic and bursts may vary in real-time (exhibit time-varying
patterns). Furthermore, current detection and mitigation knowledge on sophisticated SYN
flooding attacks is also incomplete, and most SDN modules can themselves become vulnerable to malicious TCP SYN flood behaviors.
2.5

Open Challenges
In summary, the maintenance of QoS is a crucial concern as it dominates both in-

frastructure and operational costs in SDN networks (as well as legacy networks). Indeed,
metrics such as controller response times, flow rule processing rates, forwarding delays, and
resiliency are mutually dependent upon each other and will clearly impact overall end-to-end
communication delay and achievable QoS. In this context, it is vital to develop sophisticated
processing and forwarding strategies (at both the control and data plane levels) in order to
maintain QoS and lower cost without affecting SDN controller overheads.
Now a typical solution here may be to dedicate more resources at the SDN controller
in order to reduce its response time. However, such an approach yields significantly larger
infrastructural complexity and operational costs, e.g., physical hardware and energy usage.
Moreover, the processing resources available for logical controllers at a Service Provider
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(SP) can still be limited, i.e., since operators may restrict the number of concurrent virtual
machine instances per account. As a result, applications-specific QoS may still degrade.
Furthermore, many earlier QoS studies have used port numbers to identify traffic. However,
these schemes suffer from low accuracy or assume that the network can effectively classify
incoming traffic. As such, practical applicability is low and most evaluation efforts have
only been done in simulation-based environments. Indeed, few studies have combined and
integrated priority-based flow forwarding and queueing mechanisms along with TE methods
to improve response time and end-to-end traffic delay (especially in ERS networks).
Furthermore, centralized SDN controller themselves (as well as SDN-enabled switching devices) can become potential targets of saturation attacks, e.g., such as SYN flooding
attacks. These DoS/DDoS attacks can further degrade the perceived QoS of ICT-based
services and applications. For example, an adversary might try to exhaust resources at the
SDN controller, consume excessive control plane and/or data plane bandwidth, and even
overload switch flow tables [65]. Along these lines, earlier studies have proposed various
solutions for addressing such threats, i.e., including, but not limited to [66], [57], [56], and
[21]. However, none of these studies have proposed more effective strategies using adaptive or
dynamic threshold-based kernel-level IDPS methods. Additionally, most widely-used IDPS
solutions, e.g., such as Zeek [67] (formerly known as Bro) and Snort [68], yield significant
system overheads and very high mitigation times (particularly Zeek).
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Chapter 3 : End-to-End Latency Management in SDN Infrastructures

1

As surveyed earlier, the centralized control capability in SDN presents a unique opportunity for providing QoS support. In particular, delay-sensitive traffic flows require effective
QoS mechanisms in order to minimize user latency and controller response time. Now a key
challenge here is how to handle short-term network state fluctuations (in terms of congestion
and latency) while still guaranteeing end-to-end latency performance. It is here that effective
path computation strategies can be developed and applied.
Along these lines, this chapter tables a systematic framework that utilizes active
link latency measurements to perform efficient statistical estimation of network state and
fast/adaptive path computation. The solution is also implemented in a real-world SDN controller application and tested experimentally in the Global Environment for Network Innovations (GENI), a live distributed testbed network funded by the National Science Foundation
(NSF). Overall, detailed performance evaluation results shows that the proposed framework
can effectively resolve end-to-end routes with minimal latency and also deliver significant
reduction in controller overheads.
1 Parts

of this chapter were published by the author of this dissertation study in M. Rahouti et
al. ”LatencySmasher: A Software-Defined Networking-Based Framework for End-to-End Latency
Optimization”, 44th IEEE Conference on Local Computer Networks (LCN), 2019. The IEEE does
not require individuals working on a thesis to obtain a formal reuse license (if they are the senior
authors of the published work)
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3.1

Problem Scope
This study focuses on end-user devices sending and receiving fixed rate real-time

traffic flows. The SDN network setup uses OpenFlow switches [6] that provide access to the
data forwarding plane as well as controller-switch communication (to enable state update
functions). Namely, OpenFlow Version 1.5.1 is used here, although the proposed framework is
readily extensible to more recent versions as well. Leveraging this setup, this chapter studies
end-to-end packet delay across SDN networks using statistics collection and topological path
updates. Now effective path selection implementations should try to minimize the average
delay or maximum delay, or both. Efficient use of link capacity is also another key concern
here [12]. Finally, the overheads associated with statistics collection and path updates can
also have a significant impact on end-to-end packet processing latency at switches. Hence it is
also important to address controller-switch communications overheads by reducing statistics
collection overheads and lowering the amount of flow rules generated by the controller.
In light of the above, a novel framework is now proposed, leveraging centralized SDN
control and topological views to manage end-to-end latency, i.e., including delays associated
with path search and selection and controller-switch communication. In particular, the
following techniques/methods are applied here:
• Traffic engineering: Combine empirical latency measurements with a heuristic path
computation approach to reduce end-to-end delays
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• Statistics and flow rules offloading: Define strategies to reduce the impact of control channel overheads on latency, i.e., speedup flow rule processing and improve statistics collection at the controller
Accordingly the research problem is divided into three different sub-problems, including statistics overhead and collection, latency metric estimation, and efficient path selection.
Consider the details next.
3.1.1

Statistics Overhead and Collection
Statistics collection plays a vital role in providing real-time information to SDN pro-

visioning applications. Now a major challenge here is reducing the impact and overheads
associated with topology statistics collection/inquiries. Hence a metrics matrix (M M ) is
typically defined to track various statistics measurements in a given time interval, I. Specifically, these metrics can include per-switch latency, receive speed (Rx), transmit speed (T x),
hop counts, etc. This matrix can then be used to estimate link cost to further solve the path
selection problem detailed subsequently (Section 3.1.3). Overall the M M matrix represents
the SDN topology as a weighted graph G = (V, E), where V is a set of graph vertices, each
representing a switching device, and E is a set of physical links (client-switch and switchswitch). For each link e ∈ E, the vector L(e) is also used to represent the current per-link
metrics of a path connecting a pair of nodes. Moreover, the matrix M M can also include a
respective weight function for each link e ∈ E, i.e., denoted by w(e).
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3.1.2

Latency Metric Estimation
Since SDN controllers must provide a high degree of globalized visibility, extracting,

filtering, and deploying link and device specific statistics is of key interest. Namely, the
broader objective here is to use these statistics to perform latency metric estimation and
assist with effective path computation. Now in a typical communication scenario between
two endpoint nodes, this model should ideally estimate the latency metrics associated with all
links along the respective path. These estimates can then be used for selecting the forwarding
path for network flows over a fixed time interval, I. Specifically, given the dynamicity of
network topologies, any estimated values will only be considered valid for a fixed interval.
Overall, effective estimation techniques can be used to help reduce the overhead of
statistics collection (via the SDN REST API). In turn, this approach can lower management
plane complexity as well as per-switch latency. For example, in order to measure and collect
a latency metric with OpenFlow switches, the SDN controller must repetitively transmit
multiple Link Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP) packets over a short time interval, increasing
control messaging overheads.
3.1.3

Efficient Path Selection
Path selection at the SDN controller plays a critical role in ensuring end-to-end QoS.

Therefore in the context of delay-sensitive user traffic, the proposed method must effectively
compute a route between the communicating endpoint nodes in order to satisfy latency
requirements. However, since networking topologies and link loads are highly dynamic, a

22

static minimum cost path will not necessarily yield the most effective route. Therefore,
the proposed path selection mechanism herein jointly incorporates multiple dynamic link
metrics, e.g., such as transmit/receive speeds and transmit/receive utilization per internal
link, and is detailed subsequently (Section 3.2.3).

Figure 3.1: Overview of proposed framework design

3.2

Proposed Prototype
A novel solution is now presented for improving end-to-end latency for stringent

real-time services. This framework is specifically designed to handle dynamic networking environments experiencing link congestion (which can cause excessive network delays, packet
unsequencing, and even loss). The proposed framework is shown in Figure 3.1 and consists of three modules which are now described further, i.e., statistics collection, time series
estimation, and path selection.
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Figure 3.2: Latency metric estimation by the SDN controller

3.2.1

Statistics Collection and Latency Timing
A core component of the solution focuses on collecting link delay statistics for the

SDN controller. Namely, the most recent version of the Floodlight SDN controller (Version
1.2) [32] is used to compute link latency by injecting timestamps into LLDP packets and
transmitting them as Packet Outs messages to each switching device, see Figure 3.2. In
turn, when the SDN controller receives one of its own LLDP packets back from a neighboring
switch, it processes it as a Packet In and examines its timestamp value. The “elapsed time”
can then be derived by subtracting the timestamp from the current time. Based upon this,
the latency, LatL , of a link is defined as the elapsed time minus the control plane latency of
the origin switch and the SDN switch (that originally sent out the Packet In message):
LatL = [Ct − LLDPt ] − LatSO − LatSS ,

(3.1)

where Ct , LLDPt , LatSO , and LatSS represent the current time, the timestamp in the LLDP
packet, the control plane latency of the origin switch, and the control plane latency of the
switch that sent out the Packet In message, respectively. Note that this is an approximate
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calculation, since it is difficult to estimate the exact control plane latency at each switch.
Now this is of particular concern in data center environments where latencies are in the submilliseconds range. Namely, most SDN controller clock implementations have millisecond
precision, which will limit overall estimation accuracy. For instance, if a latency is manually
set at a particular internal link to 10 milliseconds, the impact of this latency on the link
should be feasibly observed. Hence, the LLDP-based latency should be computed as follows:

t lldp tx − t lldp rx − lat tx ovs − lat rx ovs,

(3.2)

where t lldp tx, t lldp rx, lat tx ovs, and lat rx ovs represent the initial timestamp values
of the LLDP packet, the trip timestamp, the latency at the neighboring switch (that receives
and sends out the LLDP packet to the next switch), and the latency in the next hop switch,
respectively. Note that the only constraint here is for the networking environment to be
stable prior to capturing the per-link latency values (and this usually occurs after about 60
seconds of wait time).
In general, most default SDN controller implementations do not provide any type of
QoS support. This deficiency will clearly impact the delay performance of network applications and services with Round Trip Time (RTT) sensitivity [12] [26]. In particular, RTT instability can be affected by various factors, such as (1) network congestion, (2) in/outbound
latency at the SDN switches, and (3) networking topology dynamics. To address these
concerns, the proposed framework leverages the global view at the SDN controller and its
computation capabilities to estimate per-link latencies. Consider the details.

25

3.2.2

Time Series-Based Latency Estimation
End-to-end flow latency along network paths can vary randomly as it is susceptible to

dynamic changes, e.g., such as fluctuating traffic volumes, link faults, routing changes, etc.
As a result, network statistics will generally exhibit a highly dependant nature, obviating the
applicability of linear regression models with independent statistics assumptions. Moreover,
in addition to descending or increasing trends, TS data can also show seasonality trends
(whose variations will apply within a specific time window). For instance, once samples have
been collected along a path for a given time window, further estimates can be derived for
periods of bursty traffic. In light of the above, the proposed TS-based latency estimation
treats the measured per-link latency statistics as a time series observation of a random
process during time Xt . Namely, Xt is considered as a time-dependent random variable on
which a realization is made, where t denotes the sample index.
Due to its holistic and global perspective, the SDN controller can obtain access to a
broad range of topology statistics including, but not limited to, inter-switch statistics and
both internal and external per-link measurements. The latter measurements can include link
speed, transmission speed, reception speed, overall link utilization, etc. However, querying
and collecting statistics measurements via the REST API and statistics collection module
(at the controller) entails significant overheads at both the SDN controller and switches.
As a result, the end-to-end latency of network packet traffic can be unduly affected here.
Hence in order to reduce the amount of statistics inquiries made through the REST API,
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the proposed TS model performs link metric estimation. In particular, per-link latency is
estimated for a fixed window size based upon current topological statistics. Accordingly, a
Weighted Moving Average (WMA) TS-based approach is now presented.
First, consider N successive observation time instances for the per-link latencies
(along a particular end-to-end path) given by z(t) = (z(1), z(2), ..., z(N )) = (z1 , z2 , ..., zN ).
These values can be representative of N random variables distributed according to N different probability density functions, i.e., f1 (z1 ), f2 (z2 ), ..., fN (zN ). Hence the sequence of
latency metric samples received by the SDN controller can be referred to as sample realization of per-link latencies. Now Ribeiro et al. [69] proposed a moving average technique for
network bandwidth estimation by averaging recent measurements within a window size of
M . Inspired by this previous work, an Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA)
model is incorporated into the latency estimator module. Namely, this approach utilizes the
per-link latency values computed by the SDN controller as described above, and generates
a new estimate, Yi , as follows:
Yi = θi Yi−1 + (1 − θi )Zi .

(3.3)

where θi is an exponential weighting factor, 0 ≤ θi ≤ 1. Note that this approach has not
been proposed and implemented before for per-link latency estimation in networking-enabled
environments.
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Now a key requirement here is the initialization of the exponential weighting factor,
θ. Namely, if θ is chosen too large, then the previous estimates will be given increased
importance, and the end-to-end path latency estimation will not reflect current network
changes and dynamicity. However, if θ is set to a smaller value then improved estimation
agility can be achieved [70]. Ideally, however, this weighting should be adaptive such that
a value θi is defined for each current measurement interval, i. Accordingly, a dynamic
exponential weighting factor is computed as follows:
γΛ
,
t=i−M (Zt − Zt−1 )

θi = Pi

(3.4)

where Λ =| Zmax − Zmin |,
i.e., Λ is the difference between the maximum and minimum per-link latency samples within
the window size M . Overall, the estimation module starts with initial M and γ values of
10 and 15, respectively. In particular, these values are empirically chosen by taking into
account both network topology dynamics and statistics collection overheads. Note that perlink latency samples can sometimes remain unchanged for a given duration. Hence Equation
3.4 can lead to a divide by zero error. In order to resolve this concern, the dynamic weighting
factor θi is initialized to 0.5 if the observed per-link latencies remain constant within a given
time frame.
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3.2.3

Adaptive Heuristic-Path Selection
The A∗ algorithm is widely used for graph traversal and path selection [71] due to its

accuracy and performance. In particular, this scheme is an instance of the best-first search
which defines a heuristic evaluation function, f (x), as follows:

f (n) = g(n) + h(n),

(3.5)

where n is the next node on the path, h(n) is the heuristic function to predict the path with
the lowest cost from n to the target node, and g(n) is the actual cost of the path from the
initial source to the current node n, respectively. Here the heuristic function can be used
to control the behavior of the A∗ algorithm. Namely, if h(n) is 0, then the actual cost,
g(n), drives path selection according to the ubiquitous Dijkstra algorithm for shortest path
selection. Alternatively, if h(n) = g(n), then the heuristic estimation is equal to the actual
cost of traversing from node n to the destination. In this case the A∗ algorithm quickly
follows the lowest-cost path and does not explore other options. Finally, if h(n) > g(n),
then the scheme cannot guarantee that the lowest-cost path will be found, i.e., even though
it runs faster since it will not expand all nodes. Hence for effective operation, the condition
h(n) ≤ g(n) should be satisfied, i.e., meaning that the total path latency should be less than
or equal to the actual cost of moving from the current node n to the target node.
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Leveraging the above, the path selection module calculates the path based upon the
output of the latency estimation module as follows:
f (n) = g(n) + θi Yi−1 + (1 − θi )Zi ,
(3.6)
i.e., h(n) = θi Yi−1 + (1 − θi )Zi .
As per the above, the path selection module chooses h(n) to achieve dynamic path selection
to the target node. Now readily-available per-link latency estimates from the latency estimation module (Section 3.2.2) can be leveraged to specify h(n). Specifically, h(n) is basically
expressed as a set of links between two communicating nodes as follows:
h(< n0 , ..., nk >) = h(nk ).

(3.7)

In order to satisfy the desired operating condition of the A∗ algorithm, i.e., h(n) ≤ g(n), the
following expression should hold:
θi Yi−1 + (1 − θi )Zi ≤ g(n).

(3.8)

Overall, the above solution is capable of dynamically varying its performance according to
the calculated heuristic, h(n). Moreover, the shortest path between the designated end nodes
is not necessarily chosen, i.e., it may yield a path that is acceptable and close to the shortest
path depending upon the dynamics of a networking topology. This scheme also provides a
trade-off between the speed and efficiency of path selection.
Overall, the complete implementation-level description of the proposed A∗ scheme
is also given in Figure 3.3. The destination (goal) and source nodes here are denoted by
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nodegoal and nodestart , respectively. Furthermore, two lists, OP EN and CLOSED, are also
maintained for tracking purposes. Specifically, OP EN is the list of pending tasks, i.e., nodes
that are visited but not expanded (and their successors are not searched yet). Meanwhile,
CLOSED is a list of nodes that have already been visited and expanded, i.e., where the
successors have been explored and placed in the OP EN list.
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
20:
21:
22:
23:
24:

Initialize OP EN list & T S − estimator with M = 10
INPUT: G(V, E), cij ∀(i, j) ∈ E, R, F, D
OUTPUT: path vector
while the OPEN list is != empty
f (nodec ) = g(nodec ) + h(T S − estimator(nodec ))
if nodec is nodeg
return path & break
Generate each state nodes that comes after nodec
for each nodes of nodec
Set successorcost = g(nodec ) + h(T S − estimator(nodec , nodes ))
if nodes is in the OPEN list
if g(nodes ) ≤ successorcost
Go to line 20
else if nodes is in the CLOSED list
if g(nodes ) ≤ successorcost
Go to line 20
Move nodes from the CLOSED list to the OPEN list
else
Add nodes to the OPEN list
Set h(nodes ) to be the heuristic distance to nodeg
Set g(nodes ) = successorcost
Set the parent of nodes to nodec
Add nodec to the CLOSED list
return path vector

Figure 3.3: Adaptive A∗ path selection algorithm
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Figure 3.4: The experimental SDN topology on NSF GENI testbed

3.3

Performance Evaluation
The proposed latency management solution is implemented and evaluated in a live

SDN network testbed. In order to gauge the proposed framework and conduct a comprehensive empirical examination of end-to-end latency, three key requirements constraints are
incorporated when building the SDN topology. Foremost, open source SDN controller and
OpenFlow software implementations are chosen to ensure wider adoption/evaluation of the
work. Next, realistic network traffic emulation is done using a dedicated software module. Finally, the network topology is designed with multiple paths and physical links with
changeable loss rates and link speeds. As noted earlier, the solution is implemented in the
NSF GENI [72] network, a real-world federated and heterogeneous facility. This is a well-
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established testbed that allows researchers to build arbitrary network topology slices and
deploy tailored end host (traffic generation) and SDN controllers.
Now in order to comprehensively evaluate end-to-end latency performance over realistic networks, the GENI topology is chosen to interconnect nodes from Lexington, Kentucky,
Cleveland, and Louisiana, as shown in Figure 3.4. Namely, the stitching capability in the
GENI portal allows researchers to interconnect nodes from multiple aggregates (e.g., cities)
to build a larger coherent topology. Furthermore, each switching node also runs the Open
vSwitch (Version 1.5.1) protocol, whereas the SDN controller host deploys Floodlight (Version 1.2), an open source SDN controller solution.
3.3.1

Per-Link Latency Examination and Path Selection
Initial tests are done to evaluate the relative percentage error of the per-link latency

estimates. Namely, the difference between estimated calculations based upon the TS model
and the actual measured values (calculated by the SDN controller) is derived as follows:
Error =

|LatencyE − LatencyA |
,
LatencyA

|[θi Yi−1 + (1 − θi )Zi ] − LatencyA |
i.e., Error =
,
LatencyA

(3.9)

where LatencyE and LatencyA represent the estimated latency and the actual measured
value, respectively. Specifically, the relative error is calculated as the absolute error divided
by the magnitude of actual latency values (expressed in terms of percentage) as per Equation
3.9 for different observation trials. Based upon the above, Figure 3.5 plots the average relative
percentage error of multiple links in a single end-to-end path. Namely, the given path lies
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between end nodes N1 and N6 , and uses Link 1, Link 2, and Link 3 (representing inter-switch
links S1 → S3 , S3 → S4 , and S4 → S6 , respectively), see figure Figure 3.4. As expected, in the
initial steps the estimated latencies will equal the actual values since the TS estimator uses
the initially-observed per-link latency values to compute the averages (and these will closely
match the actual latencies measured). However, with increasing measurement samples, the
accuracy of path latency estimation improves notably, and the average error rate remains
below 0.2% as shown in Figure 3.5.

Figure 3.5: Average relative error of individual links in a single end-to-end path

Next, the actual and estimated path costs are compared to evaluate the effectiveness
of the proposed adaptive A∗ path selection algorithm. As discussed in Section 3.2, the
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A∗ algorithm will yield an improved path if the heuristic condition is satisfied in Equation
3.8. Hence Figure 3.6 plots both the actual and estimated latency values based upon the
TS estimator module. These results confirm that the the actual path cost is only smaller
than the estimated cost in the initial TS estimator phase, i.e., since the exponential moving
average of collected latency values is likely higher than the actual path cost.

Figure 3.6: Path selection comparison (actual versus estimated path cost)
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Figure 3.7: Latency comparison between A∗ approach and default Floodlight path selection

3.3.2

Proposed Framework Performance Versus Default Path Computation
The proposed adaptive A∗ scheme is also compared to the default path selection

algorithm in the Floodlight SDN controller. Namely, Figure 3.7 plots the throughout comparison between these two methods. Specifically, in this experimental setup, N1 and N6 are
designated as the source and target nodes, respectively. Overall, these results confirm that
the proposed framework outperforms the Floodlight path selection mechanism with regard
to end-to-end latency minimization. Namely, as long as the heuristic selection condition
holds (as discussed in Section 3.2.3), the adaptive A∗ algorithm only expands on nodes with
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lower heuristic latency values. This approach tries to reach the destination node as quickly
as possible rather than expanding every other node like the Dijkstra algorithm. Moreover,
the modified path selection module is only invoked when a better (lower) cost estimate for
the current path is found by the TS estimator module.

Table 3.1: Percentage improvement in latency (proposed framework versus default controller)
Measurement Statistics
Mean
Median

Node N1

Node N2

Node N3

3.07 %
3.82 %

6.41 %
5.95 %

4.51 %
5.07 %

Additionally, Table 3.1 also summarizes the percentage improvements in end-to-end
latency yielded by the proposed framework (versus the default Dijkstra path selection method
provided in the Floodlight controller). These results confirm that the proposed SDN-enabled
framework reduces delays by at least 3% (for the different nodes communicating with the
designated server node, N6 ).
3.3.3

Overhead Considerations
Finally, control overheads are also measured to gauge operational complexity. Specifi-

cally, the SDN controller CPU resource utilization is plotted for both the proposed framework
and default Floodlight controller in Figure 3.8. Again, these results demonstrate that the
developed framework outperforms the existing Floodlight controller implementation, i.e.,
average overhead reduction of about 20%. Overall, this improvement is mainly due to the
increased statistics collection tasks running at the Floodlight SDN controller. Specifically,
the default statistics collection feature generates a large amount of unnecessary topology and
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Figure 3.8: Overhead comparison with default Floodlight (horizontal lines plot averages)

per-link statistics in a periodic manner (every 10 seconds by default). These excessive calculations and exchanges result in notably higher controller and switch overheads. By contrast,
the proposed framework only requests individual per-link statistics when networking traffic
is initiated by an end node. Similarly new flow rules are only pushed to switches when an
alternative path with a better cost is estimated. Again, this contrasts with the default path
computation facility in the Floodlight controller, i.e., as the proposed adaptive path search
only expands along a new path if its heuristic cost (from TS estimation module) is less than
the current cost.
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Chapter 4 : SDN-Based Priority Queueing

As surveyed earlier, SDN technology provides separation between the data and control
layers in a network in order to enhance service provisioning and management. Now for delaysensitive client services, e.g., such as an emergency response, various QoS strategies can be
implemented using SDN, e.g., such as minimization of end-to-end delay, effective calculation
of forwarding paths, and minimization of SDN controller response times. Furthermore,
priority-based traffic management can also be introduced for both data and control plane
packet flows.
Along these lines, this chapter presents a novel QoS solution that leverages the global
control capabilities of SDN along with priority-based queueing and TE techniques. Termed
as QoS Priority (QoSP), the proposed solution leverages multiple queues to handle higherpriority traffic while preempting control plane traffic. In particular, the proposed scheme
distributes traffic across multiple queues with different priorities at each switch port (in the
OpenFlow devices). Furthermore, the solution is also implemented in a live SDN controller
and tested in the NSF GENI testbed facility. Overall, detailed performance evaluation results
show that the proposed QoSP scheme can effectively resolve controller latency concerns and
manage queueing times for each traffic priority in the data plane.
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Figure 4.1: Latency overview in a SDN setup

4.1

Problem Scope
As noted earlier, OpenFlow SDN-enabled networks operate in a reactive manner by

checking switch flow tables for existing rules for incoming packets. If no matching flow rules
are found, switches send OpenFlow P acket In messages (which include first packet headers)
to the SDN controller. Subsequently, the controller replies with P acket Out messages to
allow the switches to install respective forwarding rules in their flow tables (assuming that
valid routing paths are found between the nodes). Now clearly control and switching latencies
can have a notable impact on overall packet routing delays here.
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The overall breakdown of latency and messaging control is further illustrated in Figure 4.1 for a sample three switch network. Namely, the end-to-end route here traverses three
Open vSwitches, i.e., OVS1 , OVS2 , and OVS3 . Accordingly, the flow enters the switches at
times L1 , L4 , and L6 and then departs at times L2 , L5 , and L7 , respectively. Now assume
that flow entry matching procedures at OVS1 and OVS3 incur additional delays (overheads)
from P acket In messaging with the SDN controller. Hence the actual delay between OVS3
and OVS1 is given by L7 - L2 . Additionally, L3 and L8 represent the timestamps for the
P acket In messages departing OVS1 and OVS3 , respectively. In turn, this gives L̂3 and L̂8 ,
the corresponding arrival times of P acket In messages at the SDN controller. Note that
d1 and d3 also denote the propagation delays between the SDN controller and OVS1 and
OVS3 , respectively, and these values are non-negligible in larger metro-core networks. In
this context, the minimization of controller-switch communication latency is of key importance. As a result, priority-based queueing is proposed to alleviate these delays and control
the scheduling management of control packets.
Now existing OpenFlow implementations only support a basic FCFS queueing strategy to handle all ingress data flows [6]. However, this limitation can prevent data plane flows
from achieving their stringent QoS requirements in case of path congestion. To address this
concern, reordering of incoming traffic can be done in the data plane queue, i.e., according
to specific priority levels. In addition to multiple data plane queues, a control plane queue
can also be incorporated into the overall control mechanism to manage operation (via feed-
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back control from the SDN controller). Overall, this approach can reduce controller response
times and packet processing/forwarding delays based upon different priority levels.
4.2

System Overview
The QoSP provisioning framework for SDN is now presented. Foremost, this solu-

tion classifies incoming data traffic flows (packets) into multiple priority levels and buffers
them separately. A feedback control mechanism is then used to implement priority-based
transmission of all enqueued data packets, i.e., with the SDN controller performing dynamic
queue control.

Figure 4.2: Overview of SDN-based priority queueing structure (QoSP)
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The overall SDN queueing setup is shown in Figure 4.2 for both the data and control
planes in the QoSP scheme. This design relies upon a set of queues. Foremost, the uplink
channel (UC) and downlink channel (DC) queues buffer switch-to-control and control-toswitch control packets, respectively. These queues are also assumed to have infinite length.
Meanwhile, the SDN controller maintains a finite queue to store incoming lookup requests
(P acket In messages). Finally, the Open vSwitch also maintains a series of priority-based
queues for incoming data packets. In particular, four different priority levels are supported
here, i.e., normal, low, medium, and high (Figure 4.2). Overall, the control plane queues (UC,
DC, and controller) are intended for flow rules management and control, and the corresponding data plane queues store traffic with different priority levels. Furthermore, control-related
packets are also prioritized over all data plane packets regardless of the priority level of the
latter. Hence during flow scheduling, packets in the control channel queue are guaranteed
a minimal processing latency, whereas data plane packets are processed according to their
arrival priority levels.
Now consider a typical sequence of queueing actions in the above QoSP setup. Foremost, incoming data flows arriving at the Open vSwitch device (Step 1) are classified and
placed in the data plane queue in an ordered manner according to their corresponding priority level. Note that packets will only be queued if the buffer is not full and the switch
server (SS) is not busy (Step 2). Now assuming the SS is idle, a packet will be processed
and forwarded immediately if a matching flow rule entry is found in the Open vSwitch flow
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table (Step 7). Alternatively, the header of the incoming packet will be forwarded to the
SDN controller (in a P acket In message) via the UC to acquire a corresponding flow rule
entry (Steps 4-6). Further analysis and details of the proposed solution are now presented,
including a detailed analytical queueing model.
4.2.1

System Queueing Model
The end-to-end latency performance of the proposed QoSP solution is now modeled

using queueing theory. In particular, the focus is on capturing control response and datacontrol channel latencies (including queueing delays). For tractability, it is assumed that the
packet arrival rates and service times follow Poisson and negative exponential distributions,
respectively. As a result, the uplink (UC) and downlink (DC) channels can be modeled
as ubiquitous M/M/1 queueing systems, whereas the SDN controller can be modeled as a
M/M/1/K queueing system, where K denotes the maximum number of P acket In messages
that can be stored in the SDN controller. Consider the details.
End-to-end latency in SDN involves multiple factors, including propagation delay,
switching latency, and control latency. In general, the processing of incoming flows (at
a switching device) can involve significant overheads depending upon flow rule matching
procedures. Namely, unlike packets that match with existing flow rules in the switch flow
table, unmatched packets must undergo additional delay as they are forwarded to the SDN
controller, i.e., table miss. Therefore, the end-to-end latency for data packets will also depend
upon the control latency and response time. Hence consider a pair of communicating end
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nodes, n1 and n2 , and the flow route between them as a sequence of single hops rd1,2 =<
hn1 → O1 , hO1 → O2 , ..., hOi → n2 >, where h and O are the corresponding links and
switches, respectively. Now first consider the end-to-end latency in case of a table lookup
match. Namely, if the incoming flow matches an existing flow rule in the switch flow table,
the total end-to-end latency is given by:

L1,2 = P g

n1

+

j+1
X

i

Tr +

i=1

j
X

(Qi + P ri ),

(4.1)

i=1

where P ri and Qi are the processing delay and queueing delay at the i-th switch, respectively,
T rk is the transmission latency at the i-th link, and P g n1 is the propagation delay at end node
n1 . However, if the arriving flow does not match any existing flow rule, additional controller
latency and queueing delays are incurred. Hence in this case, the end-to-end latency, L̂1,2 ,
is given by:

L̂1,2 = P g

n1

+

j+1
X

i

Tr +

i=1

j
X

(Q̂i + P ri ) + C1,2 ,

(4.2)

i=1

where C1,2 and Q̂i represent the additional control latency and Open vSwitch queueing
delays. Hence based upon Equations (4.1) and (4.2), the control path latency, C1,2 , can be
written as:

C1,2

j
X
= L̂1,2 − L1,2 +
(Qi − Q̂i ).

(4.3)

i=1

In addition to the above, end-to-end latency is another critical parameter. Namely,
this value, termed as Le2e , can be derived in terms of the flow rule entry hit or miss proba-
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bility. Specifically, the average delay experienced by an incoming packet is given by:
Le2e = Lhit ∗ Phit + Lmiss ∗ (1 − Phit ),

(4.4)

where Lhit and Lmiss denote the average latencies for packets with matching and nonmatching (miss) flow rule entries, respectively, and Phit is the probability that a matching
flow rule is found at the switch. Based upon the above, Lhit and Lmiss can be estimated as
follows:
Lhit =

Le2e − Lmiss ∗ (1 − Phit )
,
Phit

(4.5)

and
Lmiss =

Le2e − (Lhit ∗ Phit )
.
1 − Phit

(4.6)

Extending upon this, the average queueing delay in the data plane at switch i, Qi , can be
derived from Equation 4.4 by subtracting the queueing delays at the SDN controller and UC
and DC queues as follows:
Qi = Lhit ∗ Phit + Lmiss ∗ (1 − Phit ) − (Du + Dd + Dsdn ),

(4.7)

where Du , Dd , and Dsdn denote the uplink, downlink, and SDN controller delays. Now let
Dls summarize these delays as follows:
Dls = Du + Dd + Dsdn

(4.8)

Hence the average waiting time per packet in the data plane queue can be calculated by
subtracting Dls from the total end-to-end latency, Le2e . Since control plane packets are
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assigned the highest priority and served in a non-preemptive forwarding manner at the
switches, the service rate for these packets will be smaller than that of data plane packets.
Therefore, given an arrival rate of λsdn at the control plane queue and an average queueing
time in the data plane queue, Qi , from Equation 4.7, the waiting time for normal packets
(lowest priority) is given by:
wp = Dre + Dovs + Doh ,

(4.9)

where Dre , Dovs , and Doh represent the residual packet service time, average switch waiting
time, and additional waiting time due to higher priority control plane packets, respectively.
Namely, Equation 4.9 represents the average time a low priority packet must wait prior
to being served and forwarded by the switch server (assuming that the corresponding flow
forwarding entry exists). Note that Dre can also be obtained by using the utilization law
[73] as follows:
Dre =

λiovs
.
µ2O

(4.10)

where µ2O and λiovs are the packet service and packet arrival rates at the switch i, respectively.
Additionally, by applying Little’s Law, and assuming a service rate of µovs packets/sec at
the switch, the average packet waiting time at the switch, Dovs , is given by:
Dovs =

λovs ∗ (Dre + Dovs + Doh )
,
µO

(4.11)

Meanwhile, the added waiting time due to control plane packets, Doh , is given by:
Doh =

Dre + Dovs + Doh ∗ λsdn
.
µO

(4.12)
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Finally, the average packet delay in the data plane for normal packets (lowest priority) can
be derived by substituting Equations 4.10, 4.11, and 4.12 into Equation 4.9. Note that both
Equations 4.9 and 4.4 will be used later in Section 4.3 to measure QoSP scheme performance.
4.2.2

Queue Control Mechanism
The proposed QoSP scheme also uses the well-known Random Early Detection (RED)

scheme [74] to manage all the data plane queues. Namely, this probabilistic mechanism increases packet drop probability after the average queue length crosses a specified threshold
(up to the maximum buffer size). Since RED operation requires detailed queue level information at the switch, a utilization monitor is also placed at the REST API to periodically
gather data plane queue statistics as well as port statistics (at OpenFlow switches). This
information is then sent to the SDN controller for each queue (priority level). Specifically,
data plane queues are instantiated by using an available port number at the switch. Detailed
statistics for each data plane queue are then collected by the utilization monitor by matching
the switch identifier with the queue instantiation port number, i.e., by using the REST API
P ortusage (OV S1 , P ort2 ) function.
The pseudo-code of the overall RED-based queue control mechanism is also shown
in Figure 4.3. This scheme tries to control queue length and avoids dropping packets from
higher priority data flows. To achieve this, the average queue size is calculated for each data
plane priority queue level. In particular, these averages are updated whenever a priority
level queue is idle, i.e., to keep track of how many packets can be forwarded during the idle

48

1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:

INPUT: P acket In; Queue Stats
OUTPUT: Feedback signal
for each packet pi
Calculate average queue size avgq
Maintain avgq running average of queue length
if avgq < minth
Low queuing −− > send packets through
if avgq > maxth
Drop packet
Protection from misbehaving sources
else
Mark packet proportional to queue length
Notify sources of incipient congestion
return Packet Out

Figure 4.3: Queue control mechanism

interval. Now based upon the feedback control signal message from the SDN controller, if
one or more data plane queues are full (i.e., congestion), the switch is instructed to drop
packets with lower priorities (than the one arriving at the switch ingress port). Hence the
probability that a given priority queue experiences packet drops increases as more flows with
higher priority levels arrive at the switching device.
Finally in order to ensure that control packets (i.e., P acket In messages) are properly prioritized over data plane packets, the solution also leverages the OpenFlow P ause
controller feature. Specifically, this action allows the switch to pause a packet’s forwarding
procedure based upon its flow table (and serializes the packet state as continuation in the
P acket In message). Later on, the SDN controller transmits a continuation flag back to
the Open vSwitch using the N XT RESU M E message, i.e., to resume processing of a data
plane packet from its previous interruption point.
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4.3

Performance Evaluation
The proposed QoSP traffic management solution is also implemented and evaluated

in the NSF GENI testbed. In particular, the same overall topology and (hardware, software)
setup configuration is used from the previous chapter, as shown in Figure 3.4. Meanwhile,
traffic generation and measurement is also done using a variety of tools, including iPerf3,
ping, and Linux-based traffic control via the TC package [75]. Detailed results are now
presented for control latency, service fairness, and end-to-end service delay.
4.3.1

Control Latency

Figure 4.4: Control latency in QoSP solution versus default Floodlight controller
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Control path latency is evaluated for data transfer between nodes N1 and N2 along
the route N1 → S1 → S2 → N2 (in Figure 3.4). Now based upon Equation 4.3, the control
plane latency, C1,2 , can be approximated as:
C1,2 ≈ L1,2 − Lˆ1,2

(4.13)

Similarly, the reverse path delay from node N2 to node N1 , C2,1 , can also be approximated
as C2,1 ≈ L2,1 − Lˆ2,1 . Hence the total control plane latency can be represented as the sum
of C1,2 and C2,1 as follows:
C ≈ (L1,2 + L2,1 ) − (Lˆ1,2 + Lˆ2,1 )

(4.14)

Note that L1,2 + L2,1 represents the overall RTT for packet miss instances, i.e., no flow rule
entry match in the switch flow table. Meanwhile, Lˆ1,2 + Lˆ2,1 represents the RTT of the same
packet experiencing a table hit, i.e., flow rule entry found in the Open vSwitch table. Hence
the control plane latency between the pair of nodes N1 and N2 can effectively be computed
by simply subtracting packet RTT values. Accordingly, Figure 4.4 compares the control
latency of the proposed SDN solution versus the un-optimized SDN controller. Here the
buffer size at the SDN controller is set to 10 kilobytes, whereas the transmission rates of the
UC and DC queues are set to 100 packets per second. Overall, the Cumulative Distribution
Function (CDF) plots show a notable improvement/reduction in average control path delay
with the QoSP scheme. In particular, the average delay is about 8% lower, i.e., mean 26 ms
for QoSP versus 34 ms for the default controller.
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4.3.2

Service Fairness
Fairness between different data traffic priority queues is also a key concern. For ex-

ample, higher priority flows can easily degrade the throughput performance of lower priority
flows resulting in bandwidth starvation for some users. Hence the service fairness of data
plane queueing is also examined by using the global fairness index introduced by Jain [76]:

F airnessIndex

P
( Xi )2
= P 2;
n Xi

(4.15)

where

Xi =

Ti
,
Oi

(4.16)

and Ti and Oi denote the measured throughput (using iPerf3) and fair (average) throughput
for sample i, respectively. Namely, this index gauges service performance based upon the
measured and expected throughputs.
Accordingly, Figure 4.5 plots service fairness results for both the QoSP solution and
default Floodlight implementation (FCFS queueing). In particular, the index is measured as
a function of the table hit probability in the Open vSwitch flow table. Overall, the findings
in Figure 4.5 show that the proposed QoSP yields much higher global service fairness. This
improvement is a direct result of the selective queueing mechanism used in this solution.
Specifically, the default setup does not prioritize control packets over data packets, thereby
impacting both queueing and switching delays for data flows (and high priority flows in
particular). By contrast, the proposed QoSP scheme yields notable improvement in service
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Figure 4.5: Global service fairness index comparison

fairness for both control and data plane packets with respect to table miss and table hit
probabilities.
4.3.3

Priority Level Delay Variation
The prioritization of data flows is crucial for providing adequate QoS support for

high-end user services, e.g., such as emergency response. Hence to further examine the
performance of the proposed QoSP scheme, end-to-end latency is empirically measured for
each data plane priority level, i.e., switch queueing delays. Now since the total queueing
time is directly impacted by link delay, flow latency is gauged for two different link delay
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Figure 4.6: Queueing delay per priority level (normal to high for QoSP scheme)

variations between nodes N1 and N2 in Figure 3.4, i.e., termed as low and high. Namely,
the link rates in the SDN topology are set to 5 Mb/s and 500 Mb/s for the low and high
scenarios, respectively. Additionally, data traffic is also generated at a speed of 5 Mb/s
and 500 Mb/s for the low and high scenarios, respectively. Subsequently, the latencies are
computed for all four data plane priority levels (normal, low, medium, and high) using 1
second time intervals. Accordingly, flows with different priority levels are then transmitted
from node N1 to node N8 in Figure 3.4, and the overall queueing delay is measured for each
flow. The respective delay CDFs for each priority level are then plotted in Figure 4.6. As
expected, higher-priority flows have the lowest delays. For example, almost 75% of higher
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priority packets experience under 0.05 ms delays. By contrast close to 65% and 40% of
medium and low priority packets, respectively, experience smaller delays. Meanwhile, very
few normal traffic flows (i.e., lowest priority) have end-to-end delays under 0.05 ms, i.e., only
about 10%.

Figure 4.7: End-to-end latency comparison

4.3.4

End-to-End Delay Validation
Finally, Figure 4.7 plots the throughout comparison between the proposed SDN so-

lution and the default SDN Floodlight controller. In this case, both nodes N1 and N6 (in
Figure 3.4) are designated as the source and target entities, respectively. Overall, the results
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demonstrate that the QoSP prototype notably outperforms the default forwarding mechanism in the Floodlight SDN controller, i.e., with respect to end-to-end latency. Namely, the
results in Figure 4.7 show that the proposed solution reduces overall end-to-end latency by
at least 5% for data transfer between N1 and N6 nodes, i.e., along the route N1 → S1 → S3
→ S4 → S6 → N6 .
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Chapter 5 : Dynamic Threshold-Based SYN Flood Attack Detection

DoS and DDoS attacks, and in particular TCP SYN flooding attacks, pose serious
threats to SDN-based network control setups. Hence a variety of IDPS schemes have been
introduced for identifying and preventing such occurrences, as surveyed in Section 2.4. However, most of these schemes yield significant performance overheads and response times,
making them inflexible and inapplicable in large-scale operational networks.
Therefore in order to address these concerns, this chapter presents a novel adaptive
dynamic threshold-based kernel-level IDPS that leverages SDN capabilities to handle TCP
SYN flooding attacks. The proposed solution is then evaluated to detect and mitigate the
aforementioned threats and also compared against traditional IDPS technologies, namely
Snort and Zeek. These tests are done using a mixture of fundamental adversary attacks, as
well as SDN-specific threats in the real-world GENI testbed. Overall, detailed experimental
results demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed scheme within SDN environments.
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5.1

Research Background and Problem
In an SDN-enabled network, switching devices (such as Open vSwitch platforms)

process packet flows according to the rules injected by the SDN controller. Namely, these
flow rules are generated and transmitted by the SDN controller to data plane switches in
either a proactive or reactive manner. Specifically in the proactive mode, the controller tries
to populate rules prior the arrival of user traffic at the forwarding device. Conversely, in the
reactive mode, the controller injects and adjusts flow rules dynamically in real-time. Hence
this study focuses on using reactive techniques to handle TCP SYN flooding threats against
SDN controllers.
5.1.1

Overview of SYN Flooding Attacks
TCP SYN flooding attacks are DoS attacks that try to overwhelm a victim’s host

computer with a large quantity of ICMP, SYN/SYN fragments, or UDP packet traffic. In
particular, these attacks appear when a single or multiple hosts are flooded by TCP SYN
segments initiating unaccomplished TCP connection requests (and hence are unable to respond to legitimate connection requests) [77]. Specifically, TCP client and server hosts use
a three − way handshake mechanism to establish a connection, as shown in Figure 5.1. Successful setup requires the client to send a SY N packet to the server host, which in turn
replies with a SY N ACK packet and immediately allocates TCP stack resources for this
established connection query [78]. Once this is achieved, the server enters a listening state,
called Transmission Control Block (TCB) [23], and stays there until it receives a final ACK
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Figure 5.1: Typical TCP handshake (top) and SYN flooding attack (bottom)

message from the client (within a given timeout interval). It is only once the client replies
back with an ACK message that the TCP session is deemed as successfully established and
data can be exchanged.
Now as per the above, TCP session establishment is very susceptible to SYN flooding
attacks, i.e., where an adversary sends a large number of half-open connections to the server
without sending closing ACK packets, also shown in Figure 5.1. These floods can lead to
resource exhaust at the server, preventing legitimate new connections from being established.
Moreover, in some cases many distributed adversarial hosts can even send a large amount of
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SYN packets using spoofed IP addresses (i.e., DDoS attacks), making it even more difficult
for a server to identify the sources of an attack.

Figure 5.2: SYN flooding attack in SDN

5.1.2

Threat and Attack Model in SDN Environment
The threat model here assumes both data and control plane vulnerably to TCP SYN

flooding attacks. Furthermore, it is also assumed that (1) an attacker is capable of sending
a large amount of TCP SYN-based traffic to an OpenFlow network, and (2) adversarial
traffic is comprised of a mixture of both legitimate and malicious packets, making it difficult
to differentiate. Accordingly, Figure 5.2 shows a realistic scenario that illustrates how an
attacker can flood the SDN infrastructure with TCP SYN packets. Here, the Open vSwitch
device receives an incoming packet stream containing a mixture of legitimate (normal user
traffic) packets and malicious SYN flooding packets (from the adversary host). It is assumed
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that the single adversary host is capable of producing a large number of SYN packets to
saturate the switching device.
Now consider the detailed interactions between the end hosts, switches, and SDN
controller shown in Figure 5.2. Foremost, the adversary host (Host A) sends SYN flooding
packets (step a) and the receiving switch checks its flow table for a matching forwarding
rule. If no flow rule matching the destination IP address is found, i.e., table-miss, the switch
forwards it to the SDN controller (step b) in the form of P acket In message. The SDN
controller processes this P acket In request and searches for the corresponding path to the
target host (assuming that there is at least one path available). It then inserts the flow
rule into the switch’s flow table (step c). Next, the switch forwards the SYN packet to the
target host, Host B (step d). Finally, when Host B receives the SYN packet, it allocates
a new buffer for this request and replies with a SY N ACK packet (step e). Similarly,
once the destination switch receives the SY N ACK message, it again forwards it to the
SDN controller for flow rule query (step f ). Upon receiving this P acket In message from
the switch, the SDN controller once again computes the return route and inserts it in the
switch flow table (step g). Finally, the switch sends a SY N ACK message to Host B
(step h). Given this handshake-based communication model, an adversary can readily insert
false source IP addresses and make the SDN controller insert spurious new forwarding rules
(step g). Namely, the forwarded SY N ACK packets to Host B will be based on invalid IP
addresses.
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In light of the above, if the adversary host transmits a large number of “spoofed”
SYN packets, it can easily flood the resources at the target host. More importantly, the
adversary can also overwhelm switch lookup tables with spurious flow rules, consuming
precious memory. Furthermore, SYN floods can impose high computational workload at the
SDN controller, i.e., P acket In processing, and also saturate bandwidth usage at the control
plane due to excessive messaging, i.e., P acket In messages and flow rules.
5.1.3

Motivation and Problem Scope
SDN environments can face many specialized threats from malicious adversaries.

Hence the simple pre-placement of flow rules in data plane switches to dismiss any nonmatching flows is not practical. Instead, SDN control implementations typically consist of
different processing policies since network traffic is usually very dynamic. For example, policies can differ according to varying network conditions or user types [64]. Indeed, dynamic
processing policies can render controller applications susceptible to security SYN flooding
threats because such policies require continuous updates during the data layer transition [64].
Now recent versions of the OpenFlow protocol also allow the SDN controller to receive information about data layer transition via incoming P acket In messages. Hence when a SYN
flooding attack occurs, the controller’s resources can easily be exhausted.
In light of the above, the first objective here is to try to maintain the core functionality
of the SDN infrastructure during SYN flooding saturation attacks. In particular, this is
done via direct installation of flow rules in SDN switching devices in real-time. Furthermore,
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another objective is to try to process table-miss flows without harming normal/legitimate
user traffic flows. In particular, simply dropping all table-miss traffic is not acceptable as
it may adversely impact legitimate users as well. Instead, whenever a SYN flooding attack
takes a place, the table-miss traffic will be sent to the corresponding data layer cache prior
to communication with the SDN control layer (via P acket In messages).

Figure 5.3: Architecture of proposed SYNGuard framework

63

5.2

Modeling and Framework Design
In order to address SYN flooding attacks in SDN settings, a novel protocol indepen-

dent IDPS solution is now presented, i.e., termed as SYNGuard. The proposed scheme runs
as an application at the SDN controller and is comprised of several modules, as shown in Figure 5.3. As noted earlier, SYNGuard makes exclusive use of SDN capabilities to monitor and
collect statistics from incoming data plane traffic and exact flow routing rules/responses. The
overall placement of this solution (in relation to the Floodlight controller and Open vSwitch
platform) is also shown in Figure 5.4. Namely, this scheme uses Open vSwitch Switched
Port Analyzer (SPAN) ports to mirror all incoming flows on the corresponding device (for
analysis). Precisely, SPAN ports support communication traffic between the application and
data layers of the SDN setup. Overall, this positioning is critical for effective identification
and threat mitigation of SYN flood traffic, as shown in Figure 5.4. Now the architectural
framework in Figure 5.3 consists of four key modules; (1) Initialization, which sets up initial
operation of the switches, (2) Inspection, which examines the traffic received through the
raw operating system socket (e.g., SPAN port), (3) M itigation, which tries to limit false
positive detection events, and (4) T hreshold Evaluation, which dynamically adjusts the
attack detection threshold according to the current record of attacks (based upon the SDN
controller view).
Now in order to determine whether incoming traffic constitutes a TCP SYN flood
attack, the pattern of incoming flows over a time frame is identified. Namely, when the
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Figure 5.4: The operational placement of proposed IDPS for traffic flow

current threshold value is surpassed by the quantity of arriving flows, the inspection module
in the framework detects/flags a SYN flood attack and generates an alert message. Contrary
to existing IDPS solutions, the dynamic threshold mechanism in the proposed framework
also relies on the state of the inspection module and frequency of generated alerts.
Overall, SYNGuard is (1) a lightweight design that uses a modular-based filtering
technique, (2) runs as an independent network application that utilizes SPAN interfaces
on Open vSwitch platforms, (3) adds minimal overhead and traffic processing latency, and
(4) operates transparently to end hosts and SDN-enabled applications. The latter ensures
improved applicability to larger networking environments. Further details are now presented.
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5.2.1

Adaptive Detection Threshold and Signature Structure
In the context of DoS/DDoS attack detection, threshold values generally refer to the

rate of attack events per second. Specifically, a detection threshold represents the rate at
which an IDPS raises an alert for an attack. For example, if the event threshold is set to
70 packets per second, an alert will be generated once the incoming packets from a source
exceeds this bound. Hence selecting an appropriate detection threshold value is critical in
order to provide efficacious response to DoS threats while reducing false alerts (i.e., threshold
value too high or too low). To address these challenges, a dynamic self-adjusting detection
threshold is proposed for SYNGuard. Consider some further details here.
Foremost, it is assumed that legitimate user flows generate TCP SYN requests at
steady intervals. Namely, the number of SYN connection requests range from [r1 , r2 ],
whereas the number of flows per SYN connection is n ≥ 3 (i.e., three-way handshake exchange). Additionally, all incoming SYN flows are assumed to follow a Poisson arrival
distribution with an average of λ flows/second. Hence in order to compute the number of
packets per SYN connection, n, the SDN controller sends a Flow Statistics Collection (F SC)
request via a OpenFlow Read State message to switches with the matched field set equal
to the IP addresses in the flow table. The value of n can then be estimated by using the
OpenFlow P acket Count parameter, which is a pre-defined metric that tracks the number
of incoming flows based upon the switch flow table, i.e.,
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n = min (pci )

(5.1)

∀fi ∈F

where F and pci are the set of flow tables and minimum P acket Count value, respectively.
Now consider the dynamic threshold update mechanism for SYN flood detection.
Here, the ubiquitous TCP Additive Increase Multiplicative Decrease (AIMD) window size
control mechanism is adopted. Namely, let ΨI and ΨD represent the updating functions for
threshold increase and decrease, respectively. Now in the default TCP AIMD mechanism,

ΨI = S + 1,

(5.2)

and

ΨD =

S
,
2

(5.3)

where S is the threshold value bounded by Smin ≤ S ≤ Smax , i.e., Smin and Smax represent
the minimum and maximum threshold ranges, respectively. Leveraging from the above, the
SYNGuard solution introduces a modified, improved AIMD mechanism that dynamically
adjusts the increase and decrease levels based upon the event state of the SYN flood threat.
Namely, now the increase and decrease operations (for the i-th interval) are given by:

ΨI = Si + α,

(5.4)

and

ΨD =

Si
,
β

(5.5)
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where Smin ≤ Si ≤ Smax , and α and β represent the threshold increase and decrease values,
respectively. Furthermore, S0 is manually initialized at a default threshold value at startup.
As a further improvement, a single update function is also defined for the detection
threshold. This function is continuously invoked by SYNGuard to update the current threshold according to both legitimate and total traffic rates. Namely, the two update functions,
ΨI (Equation 5.4) and ΨD (Equation 5.5), are now replaced by a next-round threshold value,
S(i + 1), such that:
S(i + 1) = P1 + P2

(5.6)

where P1 and P2 are defined as:
P1 = p

n
T

 h

 


i
> S(i) . q(i).ΨI S(i) + 1 − q(i) .ΨD S(i)

(5.7)

 h

 


i
6 S(i) . q(i).ΨI S(i) + 1 − S(i) .ΨD S(i)

(5.8)

and
P2 = p

n
T

Substituting P1 and P2 into Equation 5.6, and simplifying gives a threshold update function
as follows:

 



S(i + 1) = q(i).ΨI S(i) + 1 − q(i) .ΨD S(i)

(5.9)

where q(i).ΨI (S(i)) + (1 − q(i)).ΨD (S(i)) is assumed to be an integer (or rounded otherwise),
and p( Tn > S(i)) and p( Tn 6 S(i)) are the probabilities that both events
occur respectively.
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n
T

> S(i) and

n
T

6 S(i)

Now carefully note that packet signature matching may not always be the best strategy to identify SYN flood attacks, i.e., since malicious hosts may be capable of injecting
any arbitrary data bytes into packet payloads. As a result, signature matching can actually
be defeated by an adept adversary. Moreover, certain types of TCP SYN flooding attacks
may not contain proper packet payload data, e.g., low-profile SYN flood attacks. Hence, the
proposed framework also tries to match packet header information (instead of packet payload data) in order to improve anomaly detection performance. Specifically, this approach
can help increase the effectiveness of threat signature matching and detection and can also
handle low-profile SYN attacks (with no particular data format in the packet payloads).
The overall pseudo code of traffic inspection is shown in Figure 5.5, where the header
information of packet is checked using string matching techniques. Here the variables T , T h,
and Si represent the timestamp, threshold value, and list of strings (i.e., for string matching
purposes), respectively. In addition, S(.) is defined as a counter function to track the number
of packets per source address (for threshold comparison). Now if an ICMP packet is received,
the packet counter, S(.), is updated and its header information is compared with the existing
signatures, i.e., string search. Hence an alert is generated based upon the current threshold
and string matching result, i.e., anomalous packet load. Lastly, the threshold update function
is invoked for appropriate adjustment of current attack detection rate.
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1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:

Set P = P ACKET IN
Set T h = threshold value
while True
T = T ime f rame[T imestamps]; S0 = P/T
if P.T ype == ICM P
Calculate n/T
QP.SRC ADDR + +
if P.SRC ADDR NOT IN S
S(P.SRC ADDR) = T
else
if T − S(P.SRC ADDR) > T h AND Si < Smax
if Q(P.SRC ADDR) > T h
Increase T h
else
S(P.SRC ADDR) = T
else
Decrease T h if Si > Smin
return 0

Figure 5.5: Proposed algorithm for the detection threshold update

5.2.2

Overall Framework Functionality
Now once SYNGuard has been initialized, the Inspection module (Figure 5.6) moni-

tors and classifies all TCP SYN requests, i.e., established TCP handshakes, while recording
source-side connection timeouts, i.e., failed connections. Once a connection request (i.e.,
first SYN packet) is received at the data layer, the Open vSwitch searches for a matching
TCP ACK forwarding rule in its flow table or inquires about it from the SDN controller.
Carefully note that the Open vSwitch device also verifies whether the received packet type
is a TCP SYN (prior to validating the completion of the TCP handshaking session) in order
to identify unsolicited packets.
The overall finite-sate machine for the SYNGuard system is also shown in Figure 5.6.
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Figure 5.6: SYNGuard states

Here the initial state specifies all the input and global variables used in the inspection
and mitigation modules and jump starts the packet inspection process. Once a malicious
TCP SYN event is detected in the Inspection state, a string matching operation is carried
out, followed by alert generation. Next, if the current threshold value of detected events
is exceeded, the system moves to the Prevention state to mitigate the attack. Lastly, the
system also invokes the threshold update function to update the current detection threshold.
Finally, as shown in the architecture in Figure 5.3, once a flow is received at the
respective Open vSwitch port, the switch will transition from the Idle state to the Inspec-
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tion state, i.e., to start traffic inspection prior to forwarding it to the potential target. It
is expected that the network administrator will specify/enter a default threshold value at
startup as well. Finally, a secure mode option is also supported in order to allow the IDPS
solution to conduct more comprehensive deep packet (payload) inspection using exact string
matching, i.e., in the case of sensitive data. However, if the switch is located in a trusted
region, the IDPS will only perform partial string matching.
Overall, switches will continuously inspect and examine all incoming flows and keep
track of malignant adversary traffic. Based upon this, threat detection thresholds will be
updated in a dynamic manner (as per the current trace and intensity of illegitimate traffic).
For example, if a sequence of flows is found to be legitimate, the switch will decrease the
threshold Si by a value β and also select exact string matching filters (or partial ones).
Alternatively, if a particular flow is found to be malicious, the controller will forward it to
the prevention module (Figure 5.3) to either drop or block it.
5.3

Performance Evaluation
The performance of the proposed SYNGuard solution is now tested in a real-world

heterogeneous testbed setup with various networking capabilities. Again the NSF GENI facility is used here, and the proposed topology slice is shown in Figure 5.7. Namely, this setup
consists of two end hosts, Host A and Host B, SDN controllers, and four Open vSwitches.
In particular, Host A represents the adversary which transmits a mixture of legitimate and
malicious traffic to the target at Host B. Meanwhile, hosts O1-O4 represent Open vSwitches
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running the IDPS solution (in addition to performing their essential traffic forwarding operations). Finally, hosts C1 and C2 represent the SDN controllers running the Floodlight
controller software. Namely, controller C1 manages Open vSwitches O1 and O2, and controller C2 manages Open vSwitches O3 and O4, respectively. Lastly, the dashed and solid
lines represent the control and data plane links, respectively. Although a relatively simple
topology is used to evaluate the performance of SYNGuard scheme here, the solution can
readily be used in larger and more complex networking environments.

Figure 5.7: GENI testbed topology

5.3.1

Traffic Generation and Event Rules Implementation
Initial tests are done to evaluate system response time to threats under simulated

real-world networking conditions. Namely, two network traffic intent types are considered
here, i.e., adverse (malicious) and normal (benign). Packets from these flows are then gener-

73

ated and mixed into the network. Furthermore, both the iPerf and the Distributed Internet
Traffic Generator (D-ITG) toolkits are used in tandem to generate packet traffic and quantify/control it across the network. Note that iPerf also allows saturation of edge network
links, which can be used as a baseline technique to evaluate response efficiency to saturation
attacks. Additionally, both the Zeek and Snort IDS toolkits are also deployed here for rulebased detection. Namely, pre-defined detection rules are manually added or configured, i.e.,
if they are already implemented in particular version. However, in order to ensure proper
performance comparison, the only rules used for Zeek and Snort are those for SYN flood
attack detection and mitigation. Since both of these tools can handle a broader range of
network threats, comparing their associated overheads with other rules enabled will not be
meaningful (and hence they are offloaded or disabled). Accordingly, the sample scripts in
Figures 5.8 and 5.9 also show the actual detection rules for SYN-based flood traffic in the
Snort and Zeek IDS tools, respectively. Namely, in Figure 5.8 Snort raises a TCP-SYN
flagged threat alert based upon a default threshold value, e.g., whenever 70 or more packets
arrive within a 10 second interval. Meanwhile in Figure 5.9, Zeek uses a specified threshold,
n, which can be manually adjusted during configuration setup. This parameter counts the
number of failed TCP connections and raises an alert flag when this count is exceeded.
5.3.2

Performance Results
Overall, effective IDPS solutions play a critical role in countering malicious attack

traffic. As noted, adverse packet flows can result in end host resource exhaustion, link and
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alert tcp any any -> $HOME_NET 80(flags:S;
msg:"Possible TCP DoS is Detected!";
flow: stateless;
detection_filter: track by_dist, count 70,
seconds 10; sid 10001;rev:1;)
Figure 5.8: SYN ﬂooding rule sample in Snort

Global attempts: table[$addr$] of count $&$ default=0;
event connection_rejected(c: connection){
local source = c$id$orig_h;
#Get source address;
local n = ++attempts[source]; #Increase counter;
if (n=some_threshold);
#Check for threshold;
Notice(...);
#Alarm;}
Figure 5.9: SYN ﬂooding rule sample in Zeek, n is the threshold
switch saturation, as well as other bottlenecks. Therefore proper flow inspection is critical
for limiting resource exhaust. Along these lines, the performance of the SYNGuard solution
is examined with regards to the inspection times, threat response times (mitigation), threat
identification accuracy, and performance overheads. Furthermore, comparisons are also made
with some existing well-established solutions, including Snort and Zeek.
Foremost, inspection time for incoming flows is a critical parameter that directly
impacts malicious flow response times. Namely, when flows are captured by the IDPS,
the related packet information must be inserted into a buffer while awaiting inspection.
Expectedly, this waiting time will add to the overall time required for mitigating the attack
if an alert is raised. Hence in order to evaluate the inspection times of the proposed solution,
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Table 5.1: Average inspection and mitigation times and system load
Traffic Load (1,000s of packets)

100

200

Proposed IDPS
Snort
Zeek

0.0031
0.0041
0.0073

0.0068
0.0059
0.0102

0.0117
0.0145
0.0130

Mitigation (Sec.)

Proposed IDPS
Snort
Zeek

0.0029
0.0045
0.0076

0.0081
0.0073
0.0100

0.0112
0.0130
0.0128

System (%)

Proposed IDPS
Snort
Zeek

8.04
9.02
17.53

12.70
15.08
26.05

15.09
19.17
34.19

Metric

IDPS

Inspection (Sec.)

500

both the Snort and Zeek solutions are implemented with near equivalent configurations as
used in the SYNGuard scheme. Specifically, for evaluation fairness, each IDPS solution is
configured with similar threat detection signatures.
To gauge inspection times, a communication scenario is established between two hosts
using the hping3 tool. Specifically, smaller-sized packets are generated at a high rate in a very
small time window (e.g., one nanosecond) in order to achieve a high network link saturation.
Note that the proposed SYNGuard solution automatically adjusts its detection threshold,
whereas this value is static in both the Zeek and Snort schemes (and hence needs to be
manually set at initialization time). Hence these static detection thresholds are set to default
values of 10 seconds each. Experimental runs are also conducted for 15 successive trials in
an automated manner, and the results are averaged, as shown in Figure 5.10 and Table 5.1.
Overall, these findings demonstrate that the proposed solution notably outperforms both
Snort and Zeek. For example, Zeek gives almost 100% higher inspection times, whereas
Snort gives about 10-20% higher latencies. However, for some randomized runs, Snort can
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Figure 5.10: Average inspection times for SYN flooding (10 sec threshold, Snort and Zeek)

match (but not exceed) the performance of the SYNGuard scheme.
Next, consider mitigation time, which is defined as the response time to handle threatening adversary flows. Namely, once a specific flow has been detected and flagged as malicious, the mitigation time is defined as the time between raising an attack alert and taking
necessary corresponding action, e.g., drop, block, etc. Indeed, this delay is a critical factor in
assuring the availability of key operational resources in SDN environments. Now even though
the detection attributes (for malicious traffic) in each IDPS scheme are unique, the mitigation time for the SYNGuard scheme is still compared against Snort and Zeek. Specifically,
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Figure 5.11: SYN flood mitigation time (100,000 SYN flagged packets)

this value is measured as the time between attack initiation and attack rectification.
Along these lines, Table 5.1 summarizes the average mitigation times for the three
IDPS solutions using the same experimental configuration detailed earlier, i.e., threshold
initialization, threat detection signature, etc. Note that these results are averaged over 15
runs. Overall, the findings confirm that the SYNGuard solution provides relatively-similar
mitigation times to Snort, but significantly smaller than Zeek. It is assumed that each
IDPS scheme initiates blocking actions against harmful IP addresses once an attack alert is
generated. Furthermore, Figure 5.11 also plots the attack mitigation times for all schemes
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(with Snort and Zeek using their default 10 second intervals). Again, these findings show
that the SYNGuard scheme outperforms both Snort and Zeek, i.e., average mitigation times
are about 40% lower than Zeek and 20% lower than Snort.

Figure 5.12: Memory utilization (100,000 SYN flagged packets)

Now excessive inspection operations can also lead to resource drainage on the platforms running the IDPS software (due to overheads associated with examining packets).
Hence to gauge system overheads, Figure 5.12 also plots the memory utilization for each
IDS scheme for the case of a single attack with 100,000 SYN flagged packets. Here both
the Snort and Zeek solutions are initialized to use their default detection threshold (10 seconds). Carefully note that link saturation also occurs in this attack scenario. These results
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clearly show lower memory utilization with the proposed SYNGuard scheme, particularly in
comparison to the Zeek solution. Note that Table 5.1 also summarizes the measured system
load in terms of average resource utilization for a variety of network flooding attacks with
100,000, 200,000, and 500,000 SYN flagged attack packets (from adversary Host A to target
Host B, Figure 5.7).

Figure 5.13: CPU utilization for varying simultaneous attack sessions (same source)

Finally, Figure 5.13 plots the CPU utilization overhead for SYNguard, Snort, Zeek,
normal SDN (unprotected with no IDS), SLICOTS [23], and OPERETTA [24]. In particular,
SLICOTS and OPERETTA are state-of-art IDS solutions (developed by R. Mohammadi
et al. [23] and S. Fichera et al. [24], respectively) to prevent SYN flooding attacks in
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SDN networks. These schemes work by surveiling failed TCP SYN requests and blocking
malicious adversary hosts. Specifically, SLICOTS is implemented as an extension of the
OpenDayLight controller software, whereas OPERETTA is developed as an SDN framework
using the POX controller. Overall, the results in Figure 5.13 show that the SYNGuard
solution gives the lowest CPU utilization of all, i.e., many factors lower than the Zeek
toolkit. However the Snort solution performs relatively well, and closely tracks SYNGuard
performance. It is important to note that both SLICOTS [23] and OPERETTA [24] can
also prevent control plane saturation. Regardless, SYNGuard still yields slightly less impact
on CPU overheads than OPERETTA, Snort, and Zeek. Like SLICOTS, SYNGuard also
benefits from temporary injection of flow rules in Open vSwitch devices. Hence the high
rate of malicious SYN flooding traffic has less of an impact on the control-data channel,
which further decreases overall resource overheads.
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Chapter 6 : Conclusions and Future Work

This research dissertation focuses on QoS and security support in emerging ICTbased networks using SDN technologies. First, Chapter 2 presents a background survey of
some existing work in related areas. Next, Chapter 3 details a novel scheme for end-to-end
path latency management in SDN settings. Building upon this, Chapter 4 presents further
priority-based mechanisms for effective traffic management. Finally, Chapter 5 addresses the
critical topic of SDN security and tables a dynamic threshold-based countermeasures solution
for detecting and mitigating data-control channel saturation attacks. Overall conclusions
from this dissertation effort are now presented along with some discussions on potential
future research directions.
6.1

Conclusions
Overall, some of the key contributions and findings from this study are as follows:

• To the best of the author’s knowledge, this dissertation presents one of the first studies
on using SDN to develop systematic schemes to reduce end-to-end path delay and latency associated with controller-switch communication. Namely, the proposed solution
uses a time series (TS) estimation approach along with adaptive A∗ path computation
to select end-to-end paths with reduced delays.
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• This work is one of the first to introduce a QoS-aware scheme that leverages globalized
SDN control in conjunction with priority-based queueing and TE techniques. Namely,
the solution uses multiple queues in each switch port to support different data plane
traffic priority levels while preempting control plane traffic.
• To improve the security posture of SDN operation, this work also presents a novel IDPS
solution to effectively detect and mitigate data-control plane saturation attacks, i.e.,
TCP SYN floods. Namely, this solution implements a dynamic threshold event detection strategy to lower inspections, i.e., based upon the Additive Increase Multiplicative
Decrease (AIMD) mechanism.

Furthermore, the NSF Global Environment for Networking Innovations (GENI) facility, a heterogeneous and at-scale real-world testbed, is also used to prototype and evaluate
the performance of all mechanisms in this dissertation study. Whenever applicable, appropriate comparisons and analyses are also done with existing, well-established security schemes.
Overall, detailed performance evaluation studies have demonstrated that these solutions outperform existing counterpart schemes in term of accuracy and efficiency (with regard QoS
and security improvements in SDN-enabled communication systems).
6.2

Future Work
Overall, this dissertation effort presents some novel solutions for improving QoS sup-

port and security in evolving ICT networks via the integration of SDN-based technology.
Specifically, a key objective has been to reduce end-to-end delays for stringent traffic flows,
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while taking into account switching latency and controller response overheads. Hence future
efforts can consider the extension of these mechanisms into broader multi-domain SDN setups operating with multiple SDN controllers. Furthermore, other QoS strategies can also
be implemented here, e.g., such as priority-based routing and path selection for emergency
response services.
Now from the SDN security perspective, this study has presented inspection and
detection techniques to resolve data-control plane saturation attacks using dynamic thresholding. Building upon this, future efforts can also look at identifying other potential security
threats against both the data and control planes which require Deep Packet Inspection (DPI).
For example, these can include Link Discovery Service (LDS) exploitation, TCP-based packet
spoofing, and TCP reply-enabled DoS threats.
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Appendix A: Glossary

AIMD

Additive Increase Multiplicative Decrease

API

Application Programming Interface

AS

Autonomous System

CDF

Cumulative Distribution Function

DC

Downlink Channel

DDoS

Distributed Denial of Service

D-ITG

Distributed Internet Traffic Generator

DoS

Denial of Service

DPI

Deep Packet Inspection

ERS

Emergency Response System

EWMA

Exponentially Weighted Moving Average

FCFS

First Come First Served

FSC

Flow Statistics Collection

GENI

Global Environment for Networking Innovations

ICT

Information and Communications Technology

IDPS

Intrusion Detection and Prevention System

IDS

Intrusion Detection System

IoT

Internet of Things
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ISP

Internet Service Provider

IXP

Internet Exchange Points

LDS

Link Discovery Service

LLDP

Link Layer Discovery Protocol

MITM

Man-in-the-Middle

MPTCP

Multi-Path-TCP

NOS

Network Operating System

OVS

Open vSwitch

QoS

Quality of Service

RED

Random Early Detection

REST

Representational State Transfer

RTT

Round Trip Time

Rx

Receive Speed

SDN

Software-Defined Networking

Science DMZ

Science De-Militarized Zone

SLA

Service Level Agreement

SP

Service Provider

SPAN

Switch Port Analyzer

SS

Switch Server

TCB

Transmission Control Block

TE

Traffic Engineering

TS

Time Series

Tx

Transmit Speed

UC

Uplink Channel

WMA

Weighted Moving Average

XMPP

Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol
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